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Shrinking Water Resources: The National
Security Issue of this Century
Niveen Tadros*

INTRODUCTION

There are several places in the world where war could erupt over
a dwindling supply of clean water from shared water resources. As
one nation after another finds itself reaching its water resource limits,
the potential for conflict among them intensifies. Add to already
scarce reserves pollution of the water source, and the global picture
appears more menacing. In fact, public health officials attribute almost 80% of illnesses in developing countries to contaminated water;'
the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reports
that more than 35,000 children all over the world die every day from
hunger or disease caused by lack of or contamination of water.2
Whole populations and industries are currently struggling.to balance
the demands for technology and advancement against the risk of
widespread and uncontrollable pollution of major water sources.3
There is little disagreement that the environment, and specifically
the shortage of fresh water, is for many nations the national security
issue of the twenty-first century.4 "The only matter that could take
Egypt to war again is water," declared Anwar Sadat in 1979, only days
after signing the historic peace treaty with Israel.5 Since then, there
have been constant threats back and forth among Egypt, Sudan, and
* 1997 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law.

1 Joyce Starr, Nations Must Join Together for Water Conservation and Sharing Projects to

Promote World Peace, TiH Cmsm'AN ScENCE MorroNR, May 27, 1992, at 12.
2 Id.
3 See Egypt's Water Supply: Demand for Pollution Control and Purification Equipment, 16
MmIDLE EAST EXECuTIvE REPORTS 8, 9-10 (August, 1993) [hereinafter ME Exec Reps, August

1993].
4 Id.
5 Starr, supra note 1.
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Ethiopia over Nile water allocation.6 Today, the countries in the Nile

7
river basin are on the brink of conflict over their share of its water.
The Nile river basin is a prime example of a scarce water resource
severely affected by high levels of pollution from many different
sources.8 Heavy dependence on the river, a burgeoning population
growth rate, and rapid industrial and commercial growth which occurred without concern for environmental consequences have contrib-

uted to the significant deterioration of the Nile.9 Moreover, the rising

pollution concentration compounds the problem of scarcity because
pollutants make whatever water is available too contaminated for
use.

10

The international community is attempting to find solutions to
the problems of low water quantity and poor water quality. Billions of
dollars have been allocated to the Nile river basin states to help control rising pollution levels and preserve the river as the major source
of fresh water." In addition, organizations such as the International
Law Association (ILA), the International Law Commission (ILC),
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are focusing their attention on problems arising along international river basins. 2 Presently, more than 300 international treaties deal with
specific international water issues and over 2,000 treaties deal at least
in part with water.13 Some of these treaties have effectively resolved
conflicts between basin states over water allocation. However, others,
such as those concerning the Nile, have proven inadequate.
6 Tom Hundley, Water May Be the Next Flashpoint in Mideast, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 2,

1992, at 1.
7 Sudan Threatensto Revoke Nile Water Agreement, Tim FIN. Tnms LTD., July 12, 1995, at
9.
8 Nile River Pollution Linked to the Aswan High Dam, MomYcLps, Dec. 3, 1992. A report
by the Specialized National Councils on pollution along the Nile linked the rising level of pollutants to the establishment of the Aswan Dam. The Dam has caused the river to move slowly,
which in turn has caused the accumulation of pollutants. Other factors contributing to the pollution included discharge of waste materials, (the seriousness of which depends on the type of
industry), the amount of waste discharged, abuse of fertilizers, river vegetation, sewage, and
wastes discharged by Nile cruisers and floating hotels. Id.
9 ME Exec Reps, August 1993, supra note 3, at 8.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 9-10. Over the last 14 years the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been the largest donor for urban projects which treat water in Cairo, Alexandria, and other medium size cities. Id. USAID has invested approximately $2 billion dollars.
Id.
12 Andrew W. Samaan, Enforcement of InternationalEnvironmental Treaties:An Analysis, 5
FoRDHAM ENvL. L.J. 261, 262-68 (1993).
13 Pamela LeRoy, Troubled Waters: Populationand Water Scarcity, 6 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVT'L
L. & POL'Y 299, 319 (1995).

1092

Shrinking Water Resources

17:1091 (1996-97)
Currently, the Nile basin states must look at ways to draft regional water sharing agreements that also provide a framework for
pollution control.' 4 Until recently, all the Nile agreements focused
strictly on water allocation and failed to adequately address pollution
control. Egypt, the country farthest downstream, has led the effort to
draft new international water allocation agreements that include pollution control schemes. 15 However, Egypt cannot win this fight alone.
Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
while serving as Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in 1989,
told the United States Congress that "the national security of Egypt is6
in the hands of the eight other African countries in the Nile basin.'1
Because it is the country farthest downstream, Egypt's attempts to
control pollution along the Nile will be futile unless it is joined by the
remaining Nile basin states.' 7
This article addresses the pollution problem along international
water basins by looking specifically at the Nile river basin states, and
examines the possibilities for cooperation in preventing a catastrophe.
Part I reviews the status of the Nile river pollution problem and
surveys the principles and treaties which currently govern the Nile basin states. Part II surveys existing international water law principles
available for adoption by these states. Part Ill analyzes the shortfalls
of current international water law principles, and suggests provisions
of a treaty. Part IV proposes the establishment of a forum for resolution and enforcement of international agreements.
I. CURRENT

STATE OF THE NILE RIVER BASIN STATES

The Nile has fueled much of the socio-economic growth of the
basin states, but has also generated much debate and tension. The
source of water for millions of people in Africa, it is shared by nine
basin states, including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire,
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.' 8 The Blue Nile and the
14 According to statistics from the Cairo Liver Institute, the Nile river pollution is contributing to the growth of disease, and particularly hepatitis, among Egypt's population. Cherif J.
Cordahi, Egypt: EnvironmentalistsSay River Pollution is Increasing Disease, INTER PREss SERVICE, June 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, INPRES File.
15 ME Exec Reps, August 1993, supra note 3, at 8.
16 LeRoy, supra note 13, at 312.
17 Nashwa Hanna, Egypt Minister Calls for Water Strategy, UNrrED PREss INT'L, Aug. 3,
1995, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, UPI File. A Minister of the Egyptian government
has called for a new strategy in the relations among the Nile river basin states in order to prevent
a water shortage and to provide Egypt with its 'basic' needs by the end of this century. Id.
18 Dante A. Caponera, Legal Aspects of TransboundaryRiver Basins in the Middle East: the
Al Asi (Orontes), the Jordan, and the Nile, 33 NAT. REsouRcEs J.629, 650 (1993); L. Kukk &
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White Nile are the two major tributaries of the River. 19 The Blue Nile
originates from Lake Tana in Ethiopia, and the White Nile flows from
the great lakes of Central Africa (Lake Victoria, Kagra, Victoria-Nile,
Lake Mobuta, Sese Seko, Albert-Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, Bahr-el-Zeraf,
and the White Nile) and is shared by Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and
Uganda.2 ° The Nile technically begins where the Blue Nile and the
White Nile meet, in Khartoum, Sudan, and flows out through Egypt
toward the Mediterranean Sea.21
A. Colonial, Developments - through 1959 Agreement
British colonial control of Africa shaped the history of the Nile
basin states. After gaining control of Egypt in 1882, the British struggled for nearly two decades to subdue the sparsely populated Sudan
and gain control over the Nile's headwaters. 2 In 1929, the British and
Egyptian governments reached an agreement assuring British control
of Sudan predicated on Sudan's subordination to Egypt's dominant
position of the Nile. 23 Ultimately the following clause of the agreement preserved Egypt's traditional and historic uses and granted
Egypt the power to reject developments in Sudan and other upper
riparian states:
Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the
River Nile or its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows so far as
all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration,
which would, in such a manner as to entail prejudice to the interests of
Egypt, either reduce the quantities of water arriving in Egypt, or modify
the date of its arrival, or lower its level.24
David A. Deese, At the Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and Cooperation Over Fresh Water, 1
UCLA J. INT'L & FOR AF'. 21, 41 (1996). Only the Danube, the Niger, and the Zaire rivers
have as many or a greater number of basin states sharing their waters. Id.
19 Kukk & Deese, supra note 18, at 41-42.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Joseph Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally-SharedWater Resources: Restricted Sovereignty v. Community of Property, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 48
(1994). The British began work to extend irrigation in Sudan after obtaining agreement from the
basin states controlling various sources of the Nile not to change the Nile waters without British
consent. Id.
23 Id.

24 Lisa M. Jacobs, Sharing the Gifts of the Nile: Establishment of a Legal Regime for Nile
Waters Management, 7 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. LJ. 95, 109 (1993) (quoting the text of the British
High Commissioner in Cairo, Lord Lloyd's note, reprinted in U.N. Legislative Series: Legislative
Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, at 107, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963)).
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Under the provisions of the treaty Egypt was allocated 48 billion cubic
meters (hereafter BCM) annually of water while Sudan could use only
4 billion cubic meters.' Though the agreement clearly favored Egypt,
it was accepted by Sudan, and put an end to years of violence and
negotiation on the matter.2 6
However, when Sudan gained independence in 1953, it demanded
modification of the restrictions set forth in the 1929 Agreement.2 7
This demand resulted in the Agreement of 1959 between Sudan and
Egypt.28 The new agreement included reciprocal consent to new dams
in each country: the High Dam at Aswan in Egypt and a new dam on
the Blue Nile in Sudan.2 9 In addition, the Agreement allocated between Sudan and Egypt the flow of the Nile and set forth Egypt's
historical right to the Nile waters.30 The Agreement provided for full
utilization of the Nile waters, allocated 55.5 BCM of water to Egypt
and 18.5 BCM to Sudan, and did not reserve any share for the upstream riparians.3 1 The Agreement further sought to present a united
front to other Nile basin states, stating:
[B]oth republics agree to study together [the claims of the Nile basin
states] and adopt a unified view thereon. If such studies result in the
possibility of allotting an amount of water to one or the other of the
territories, then the value of this amount at Aswan32 shall be reduced in
equal shares from the share of the two Republics.
While this Agreement solved the problems between Sudan and
Egypt, it failed to address specifically the rights of any of the other
riparians, mainly Ethiopia. 3

25 Id. at 109.
26 Id.

27 Dellapenna, supra note 22, at 48. Sudan specifically objected to the planned Aswan High
Dam, fearing that it would flood parts of Sudan. Id.
28 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, Sudan-Egypt, 453
U.N.T.S. 51, 51, reprinted in U.N. Department of Technical Co-Operation for Development;
Natural Resources/Water Series No. 13: Treaties Concerning the Utilization of International Watercourses for Other Purposes Than Navigation: Africa at 92, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/141, U.N. Sales
No. E.F.84.1I.A.7 (1984) [hereinafter 1959 Nile Waters Agreement].
29 Id. at art. 2.
30 Id. at art. 1; Caponera, supra note 18, at 657-59.
31 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 28; Caponera, supra note 18.
32 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 5.
33 LeRoy, supra note 13, at 319.
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B. Problems with Other Agreements, 1959 - present
Other attempts and agreements made to include the remaining
states in projects and discussions have also failed. 4 Specifically, two
problems plague the existing agreements. First, these agreements do
not include all the Nile states. Second, in the main, these agreements
pertain to water allocation, neglecting to adequately address the growing pollution problem."
1.

Failuresto Include and Address the Rights of All the Basin States

To date, there is no agreement or treaty that includes all of the
basin states, nor is there one that is recognized and accepted by the
excluded states.3 6 Thus, the Nile basin states must look towards de-

veloping a comprehensive agreement that addresses the rights of all
the basin states.
In the past, comprehensive agreement proved difficult to accomplish for two reasons. First, Egypt firmly and consistently asserted its
superior "historical" rights to the Nile water.37 Many of the Agreements that endorsed this "historical" right were drafted while most of
the African colony was under British rule. During this time, Egypt's
claim to the Nile was favored in treaty arrangements because the British were anxious to preserve their position of control over the Suez
canal.38
34 Caponera, supra note 18, at 659. The relevant agreements that are in existence today
include: the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 28; Treaty of 1977 Establishing the Kegera
River Basin Organization between Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda Concerning the
Development of the White Nile; Agreement of December, 1992 Setting up a Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environment Protection of the Nile
Basin (TECCONILE), and the Agreement of July 1, 1993 between Egypt and Ethiopia Establishing a Framework for Cooperation in the Utilization of the Waters of the Nile River. Agreement of July 1, 1993 between Egypt and Ethiopia, Survey of World Broadcasts, ME/1731, A/4, of
3 July, 1993, [hereinafter 1993 Nile Waters Agreement].
35 See generallyBondi D. Ogolla, Water Pollution Controlin Africa: A Comparative Study, 33
J.A.L. 149 (1989).
36 Caponera, supra note 18, at 657-59; 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supra note 28. The 1993
Agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia was negotiated because Ethiopia was not a party to the
1959 Nile Waters Agreement. However, the existence of this agreement is difficult to reconcile
with the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, which took into account full utilization of the Nile water
solely between Egypt and Sudan and failed to recognize the legitimate rights of any other riparian. 1993 Nile Waters Agreement, supra.
37 Caponera, supra note 18, at 657-59. See also Jacobs, supra note 24, at 105-14.
38 Caponera, supra note 18, at 659. Almost all past Agreements concerning water allocation
recognized Egypt's "historical" rights. Id.;
see also Jacobs, supra note 24. Also drafted during
British rule, the Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Egypt read in part: "no
irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the Nile.. .so far as all
of these are in Sudan.. .which would, in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to interests of
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Even after British rule ended, Egypt continued to assert a claim
of "superior" or "historical" rights to the Nile.3 9 By reaffirming its
prior use and previously established rights, Egypt has claimed priority
over future uses.4 ° Moreover, as the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement
demonstrates, 41 Egypt has claimed not only that other states may not
use the river in any way harmful to Egypt, but also that the Nile does
not belong to the others to use.42 This Agreement provides for use of

the Nile only by Egypt and Sudan, sets Egypt's claimed historical use
at 55 billion cubic meters, and neglects to reserve any share for the
upstream riparians. 43 Egypt's assertion of its historical rights contradicts the accepted water rights doctrine of equitable utilization, 44
45
which requires that all states' claims be considered equally.
Beyond merely asserting a historical right to the Nile, Egypt's
economic power enabled it to enforce its historical rights. For the last
30 years, Egypt has been the dominant economic power of the Nile
basin, with a per capita gross national product two times that of Sudan
and five times that of Ethiopia. 46 This position enabled Egypt to dictate many terms with respect to the Nile waters and forge ahead with
water projects of its own.4 7 Specifically, Egypt has attempted and succeeded in using its superior political position internationally to block
financing of Ethiopia's water projects.' Also, Egypt has stood by its
to the Nile waters and demanded adherence to the
"historical claim"
"no harm" rule.4 9 At first glance it appears that Egypt's stance may
Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt or modify the date of its arrival, or
lower its level." See Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Egypt, 93 L.N.T.S. 46
(1930). This agreement ultimately preserved Egypt's traditional and historic uses, as well as its
status as the primary riparian. Id.
39 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 109. Even while under the rule of Great Britain, Egypt was
accustommed to using the Nile as it desired, and has since considered others' needs as a second
at 106-09. After British colonial rule ended, Sudan and Egypt argued over
tier consideration. ld.
their rights and use of the Nile. Id. at 110-11. In the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, Sudan finally
recognized Egypt's "historical" rights, agreeing that the amount of the Nile water used by Egypt
before the signing of this agreement would be Egypt's acquired right. Id. at 110-11.
40 See id. at 111-12.
41 1959 Nile Water Agreement, supra note 28.
42 Id. at 110.
43 Id,

44 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 99.
45 Id.While this does not mean that all basin states get an equal share of the Nile water, it
does mean that each country's claim is given equal weight Id.
46 Caponera, supra note 18, at 656.
47 Id.

48 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Rivers as Legal Structures: The Examples of the Jordan and the
Nile, 36 NAT. .EsoijRcrs J. 217, 247 (1996).
49 Id.
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be successful because Egypt draws from the Nile as much as 71 billion
cubic meters of water per year, 16 billion cubic meters more than its
allocation under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. °
Second, a comprehensive agreement has been difficult to accomplish because attempts to organize cooperative efforts have failed as a
result of existing cultural and religious differences have exacerbated
tensions between the basin states. 51 In 1981, Egypt and Sudan attempted, without success, to organize a committee that would observe
Nile activity and encourage increased cooperation among the entire
Nile basin states.52 Yearly meetings have been held with representatives from Egypt, Sudan, Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and
Uganda.53 But beyond holding meetings, this Committee has no official authority and has not done much.54 These meetings underscore
the fact that differences in ethnicity, language, culture, and religion
have obstructed efforts to negotiate water sharing agreements.5 5 "Accusations pass back and forth as to the attempts of various religious
and ethnic factions and their financial and military backers to overthrow the governments of neighboring states. '5 6 However, the majority of these nations do share one belief; they have little regard for the
existing Nile Agreements because most of these states are not parties
to these treaties, and previously had no voice in water sharing
negotiations.
The long term failure to include all the basin states in an agreement appears to be ending because of the current state of the region.
The Middle East is currently the region suffering the most severe
water shortage in the world.57 For instance, the population of the
Middle East has available less water per capita than any other large
region on the planet.5 The population of some of the basin states has
been growing at alarming rates, increasing not only the demand for
water but the pollution of water resources.5 9 Reports provide that in
50 Susan Aschoff, Cooperative ConservationSeries: Discovery, ST. PETERSBURG TiMis, Apr.
16, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, STPETE File.
51 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 115-18.
52 ROBERT 0. CoLuNs, TIE WATERS OF ThE NILE 289-92 (1990).
53 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 115. Kenya and Ethiopia had originally declined to participate,

but have occasionally taken part in some sessions. Id
54 Id.

55 Id. at 118.
56 Id
57 Dellapenna, supra note 48, at 219.
58 Id

59 Caponera, supra note 18, at 655-56. The Nile is increasingly affected by higher levels of
pollution caused by excessive and improper use. ME Exec Reps, August 1993, supra note 3, it8.
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1987, there were approximately 117 million people in Egypt, Sudan,
and Ethiopia. 6' By the year 2000, the population in these countries
will be between 160 and 170 million people.61 Moreover, [Egypt's current dependency on the Nile water, coupled with increasing use of the
river by upper riparians, underscores its need to reach a joint agreement which addresses both water pollution and water sharing concerns]. Egypt obtains 97% of its water supply from the Nile.6 2 Thus,
while Egypt's population is expected to increase by 25 million people
from its 1990 population estimates, its supply of the Nile water is expected to drop as drought conditions persist and as upper riparians
continue to divert and pollute the waters.63
Also, many of the basin states located at the headwaters of the
Nile have only become independent since 1959. 64 These countries
have just recently undertaken to develop their economies through exploiting the Nile waters. 65 Ethiopia and other upper riparians which
have not substantially used the Nile waters in the past now intend to
reserve a share of the water for future hydraulic projects within their
territories.66 These states that are not parties to the existing Nile
agreements are now making decisions concerning investments in
water projects and irrigation schemes that will affect the lower riparians.67 Ethiopia in particular has announced various plans for future
water projects that will undoubtedly affect the flow of the Nile
water. 68 The interests of the other upper riparians, such as Burundi,
Kenya, RWanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire mainly concern power
production and the control of floods. 69 However, to date, these up-

stream riparians are not making any significant use of the Nile waters,
60 Caponera, supra note 18, at 655.
61 Id. at 655.

62 LeRoy, supra note 13, at 312.
63 Kukk and Deese, supra note 18, at 42. In 1984 the river's water level dropped to the lowest
level in over a century, from the 55.5 BCMs normally allocated to Egypt to 38 BCMs. Id. Irrigation projects and other uses of the river by upper riparians continue to diminish the amount of
water reaching Egypt. SuRvEY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, ME/1731, A/4, JuLY 3, 1993;

Caponera, supra note 18, at 654. Moreover, Ethiopia has made plans for projects to utilize the
waters of the Blue Nile, such as the Tana Beles irrigation project, which would divert the water
of Lake Tana into the valley of the Belles, and the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda, which was
completed in 1954. Id. Also, there are plans for reclamation plants, storage reservoirs, and diversion canals similar to those used to divert water from Bahr-el-Ghazal to the White Nile and
from Machar through Adar to the White Nile. Id.
64 Dellapenna, supra note 48, at 242.
65 Id.

66 Caponera, supra note 18, at 665.
67 Id.

68 See id. at 661.
69 Id. at 662.
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nor are their views concerning water allocation openly known.7 °

Thus, as the farthest downstream of any of the Nile basin states, Egypt
is therefore vulnerable to unilateral-withdrawals of water by the upstream riparians outside the framework of its current agreements.71
Therefore, increases in the population of the basin states coupled
with the rising pollution and diversion of the Nile waters have introduced an immediate need for agreement in the region. The Nile basin
states are faced with a potentially grave and devastating situation, and
as a result are ripe for negotiations and adherence to international
treaties.

2. Failures to Provide a Pollution Prevention and Control
Framework
The second problem with the existing agreements is that they
make little or no mention of pollution problems. Rather, the agreements address limited rights to use and navigate the river and to undertake construction of hydraulic works along the river.72 This lack of
attention to regulating and controlling pollution reflects the policies of
the Nile basin states toward pollution both within their own boundaries and with respect to the Nile.
The Nile basin states have had to balance their pursuit of economic development with the need to protect the Nile from pollution
caused by industrialization.73 By placing the emphasis on industrialization, the basin states have undercut state or private accountability
for pollution.74 In many of the Nile basin states the state itself owns,
either completely or in large part, the industrial projects that are a
major source of pollution. 75 However, the basin states have failed to
impose regulations on state-owned industries because they found in70 Id.
71 Id. at 660.

72 Caponera, supra note 18, at 656.
73 Paul R. Williams, Can InternationalLegal Principles Play a Positive Role in Resolving
Central and East European Transboundary Environmental Disputes?,7 Gao. INT'L ENVT'L L
REv. 421, 428-29 (1995). "Economic factors are those which influence the balance between inId.
dustrial protection and environmental preservation ....
74 See generally Ogalla, supra note 35; See Ahmed Shawky, The State Accountability for
Harmful Impacts on Health Caused by Industrial Pollution in Egypt, Trmn WORLD LEGAL

STUDIES 135, 149 (1993). "The liability of the state in this respect may be based on the failure of
the administration to take administrative control measures ... " Id. (It is well established that
pollution from industrial projects causes harm to the public health). See id.
75 id. at 143.
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dustrial development to be more crucial to their countries. 76 The basin states have also failed to regulate and enforce pollution standards
on private industries. 77 Ironically, the industries that enjoyed lax regulation in the past are the same ones now finding the shortage of
water along the Nile counter-productive. 78 Alarming statistics on
health ailments, the falling water level of the Nile each year, and the
river's highly polluted condition, have finally attracted the attention of
the basin states. Moreover, today, states must not only address pollution problems within their own borders but must also seek to protect
neighboring states. As the pollution problem increases, states will be
more receptive to protecting the environment both inside and outside
their own boundaries.
As a result of the pollution of the Nile, the amount of water allocated by the agreements does not reflect the actual amount of water
available to the states.79 Countries like Egypt are unable to use the
allocated amount without extensive treatment of the water because it
is so highly polluted. 0 Thus Egypt, which has resisted sharing the
Nile in the past, now has much to gain from increased cooperation.,'
II. ExISTING INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PRINCIPLES

A. Territorial Sovereignty
The evolution of international environmental law, and in particular, international water law has recently been the subject of much
analysis and debate. Originally, customary international law established that utilization of an international watercourse within a basin

state boundary was an expression of the state's sovereignty over its
natural resources.' Thus, no international law prevents a state from
exercising its legitimate right over its resources.83 Also known as the
Harmon Doctrine,84 this theory of absolute territorial sovereignty has
76 Id. "No rules have been issued in Egypt to identify administrative liability for protection
of public health from industrial pollution, and no established views have been defined by the
Egyptian judiciary in this respect." Id. at 151.

77 See generally Ogalla, supra note 35.
78 Caponera, supra note 18, at 653.
79 See ME Exec Reps, August 1993, supra note 3.
80 Id.

81 Caponera, supra note 18, at 660.
82 Michael D. Hodges, The Rights and Responsibilitiesof Using an InternationalWaterway, 4
J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 375, 376 (1995).

83 Id.

84 U.S. DEPT.

OF JUsTIcE,

21

OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

274 (1895).

[Hereinafter Dept of Justice.] Attorney General Harmon outlined his opinion to the United
States Secretary of State regarding the Rio Grande in 1895. Id. The United States has since
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been favored by upper riparians; the theory gives an upper riparian
state the right to use a river in whatever manner it desires and to
adopt all uses suitable to its interests without considering the impact
on other states of transboundary waters.8 5 Therefore, a state claiming
absolute territorial sovereignty over an international water basin
would incur no liability or obligation to other states for its use. 6
The idea that environmental regulation stops at state borders has
become impractical in the modern framework of environmental water
law, especially when the potential scope for harm and damage from
domestic'actions extends far beyond that of the state boundary.87 For
this reason, domestic courts, international courts, and international
legal instruments have accepted the principle of limited, rather than
absolute, territorial sovereignty. 8 The theory of limited territorial
sovereignty has its origin in the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non
rejected the Harmon doctrine. Kevin P. Scanlan, The InternationalLaw Commission's FirstTen
Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses:Do They Adequately Address all the Major Issues of Water Usage in the Middle East?,19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
2180, 2207-08 (1996).
85 DEFPT. oF JusTicE, supra note 84.
86 Id.
87 Sudan Economy, INTERNATIONAL CouNRY RISK GuIDE - MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA, JULY 1, 1995, at 1550. "Because both pollution and ecosystems cross state lines, a patchwork of national environmental regulations is ineffective and inefficient." Id. The EEAA
identified 42 companies they consider "black spots," or polluted areas, which were located along
the Nile river and which dumped pollutants into the Nile. EEAA is working with the companies
to clean up their effluent. See also Environmental Affairs Agency Targets Seven Industries to
Clean Effluent, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Aug. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, BNAIED File [hereinafter Environmental Agency, BNA Daily].
88 See International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 2406, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, (1973). The
Convention states that nations have:
"....[T]he sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."
See also Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. at 3 (1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48114 at
2-65, and Corr. 1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].The Italian
Court of Cassation has held with respect to the River Roja that "international law recognizes the
right on the part of every riparian state to enjoy, as a participant in a kind of partnership created
by the river, all the advantages derived from it for the purposes of securing the welfare and the
economic and civil progress of the nation.... However,... it cannot disregard the international
duty derived from that principle, not to impede or to destroy as a result of its regime, the opportunity of the other states to avail themselves of the flow of water for their own personal needs."
Sociftd Enrgie Elctrique du Littoral Mdditeran~an v. Compagnia Impresse Electtriche Liguri,
47 Ann. Dig. 120,121 (Cass. 1938-1940)(Italy). Similarly, in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration, Spain
unsuccessfully objected to a French hydroelectric power plant because it would alter the flow of
a river crossing into Spain. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v Fr.), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
Notwithstanding its holding for France, the upper riparian state, the Permanent Court of Justice
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laedus (use your property and perform your activities without damage
to others). 89 The theory allows states to us'e resources within their
territory as they like so long as such use does not harm the interests of
other states.' The theory thus abandons the Harmon doctrine and
absolute territorial sovereignty.
However, states are fearful of relinquishing their absolute territorial sovereignty claim. States tend to aggressively defend their sovereignty when entering agreements because they weigh their physical
integrity and continued existence as important elements of their foreign policy. 91 Thus, even a state that is completely satisfied with the
proposed agreement is less likely to assent to it if it must sacrifice a
great deal of its sovereignty. 92 Therefore, they often opt to negotiate
bilateral treaties with another state where they can negotiate terms
with specificity, and create specific obligations, rather than approve
treaties that accept international principles articulated in conventions
or other sources of international law.93
B.

Codification of Theories of International Water Law

Laws and principles concerning international water law have yet
to be clearly defined or firmly established. 94 There are four identifiable competing theories of international water law. 95 First, the theory
of absolute territorial sovereignty allows a state to do as it pleases
with the water within its territory and without considering the effect of
its conduct on neighboring states. 96 Second, the absolute principle of
territorial integrity and sovereign equality, also called "riparian
rights," requires that water must be allowed to flow downstream substantially unchanged in quality and quantity.9 7 Downstream states are
thus able to object and veto any major utilization of the water by upalso endorsed the principle of limited territorial sovereignty. It held that states undertaking
work on an international waterway should take into account interests of other states. Id.
89 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 99.
90 Charles B. Bourne, Fresh Water as a Scarce Resource, Remarks at a Panel Discussion at
the Canadian Council on International Law Conference, (October 1989) (Ascmi, r
AVAILABLE).

91 See K. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLrrcS 91 (1979).
92 See Developments in the Law, - InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.

1484, 1553 (1991) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
93 1L.; Hodges, supra note 82, at 381.

94 Modem international water law centers around terms such as "reasonableness" and "appreciable harm" which do not provide a rigid framework for analysis, but require constant interpretation and analysis.
95 Bourne, supra note 90.
96 Id.

97 Ld.
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stream states. Third, the restrictive theory of territorial sovereignty
and integrity, also called "prior appropriation," gives the first utilization priority.98 Hence, existing uses must not be affected by subsequent developments. Finally, the theory of "equitable utilization" 99 is
the prevalent one in international water law today. The principle of
equitable utilization conflicts at times with another accepted principle,
that of "no hann."'100 For instance, equitable utilization requires a
balancing of factors relevant to determining whether a suggested use
is reasonable and equitable. 101 However, the no harm rule precludes
uses that result in a significant, substantial, or appreciable threshold
level of harm. 102 Thus, while equitable utilization might permit significant harm as a result of concluding a use to be equitable and reasonable, the no harm principle would not.0 3
The International Court of Justice can impose a particular theory
of water use on disputing parties in accordance with international
law1 °4 However, because the Court lacks compulsory jurisdiction, it
only has jurisdiction over international river disputes when the parties
agree to the court's jurisdiction.0 5 Therefore, it is up to the states to
include in their negotiated agreements the principle by which they will
abide.
Three guiding authorities of international river basins are the
Helsinki Rules, the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, and the Third Restatement Concerning Foreign Relations. While each contains many of the developed principles of modem day water law, they provide only a framework, and leave much to
be negotiated by the basin states.
98 Id.

99 See Richard K. Paisley & Timothy L. McDaniels, International Water Law, Acceptable
Pollution Risk and the Tatshenshini River, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 111 (1995).

100 Patricia K. Wouters, An Assessment of Recent Developments in InternationalWatercourse
Law Through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation, 36 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 417, 419-20 (1996).
101 Id. at 419.
102 Id. at 419-20.
103 Id. at 420.
104 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]. The Statute provides that:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply (a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; and (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law.
105 See id. at art. 36.
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1.

Equitable Utilization and the Helsinki Rules

The 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (Helsinki Rules), published by the International Law
Association (ILA), was the first comprehensive expression of international river basin principles. °6 The Helsinki Rules begin by providing
a definition of an international drainage basin as "a geographical area
extending over two or more states determined by the watershed limits

of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters,
flowing into a common terminus." 0 7
Until the codification of the Helsinki Rules there existed various
theories and principles concerning the use of international watercourses. The Helsinki Rules adopted the fourth theory of international water law, equitable utilization, 08 which has received the most
attention in the international arena. The theory of equitable utilization permits each watercourse state' 0 9 to utilize an international watercourse within its territory in an "equitable and reasonable matter,"
as long as it takes into consideration the legitimate rights and interests
of all other users."10 Thus, equitable utilization does not require that
each basin state receive an equal share of the river water,"' but only
that the needs of each state be considered on an equal basis with the
needs of other watercourse states."2 This principle assigns to each
user the duty to consider harm to other states and cooperate in the
watercourse's protection and development."' Equitable utilization is
only effective when the states agree to work together to gather and
106 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 100-01. However, the Helsinki Rules are not an international
treaty, since they do not represent particular states' agreements, but are a statement of principles
that can be adopted by states if they desire. Id.
107 Report of the Fifty-Second Conference: Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, August 20, 1966, 52 I.L.A. 484-85 (1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
108 Id. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules states that equitable utilization entitles each basin
state, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters
of an international drainage basin. Id. at art. IV.
109 A watercourse is a system of surface and underground waters constituting by virtue of
their physical relationship a unitary whole and flowing into a common terminus. DraftArticles
on the Law of Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, Report of International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-ThirdSession, art. 2(b), U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No.
10 at 161, U.N. Doc A146/10 (1991) [hereinafter UN ILC Forty-Third Session]. An international
watercourse is a watercourse, parts of which are located in different states. Id. at art. 2(a). A
Watercourse State is a State in whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated.
Id. at art. 2(c).
110 See BONAYA A. GODANA, AFRICA'S SHARED WATER REsouRcEs: LEGAL AND INSTrTUTIONAL AsPEcrs OF THE NnLE,NIGER AND SENEGAL RivER SYSTEMs 50 (1985).

111 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 99.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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and demanded in
share data concerning the amount of water supplied
4
the river basin that runs through their territory.1

The Helsinki Rules enumerate factors relevant in employing the
"reasonableness" test to determine a reasonable and equitable utilization of a water resource.1 5 However, the theory merely enumerates a
non-exclusive list of factors which are to be used to determine what
reasonable use means; 116 the Rules do not give preference to one reasonable use over another. 117 The weight to be given to each factor is
to be determined by its importance in comparison with that of the
other relevant factors. For instance, the Helsinki Rules do not prefer
an industrial use of the watercourse over an agricultural use. 118 Thus,
what is a reasonable water use to one country may be unreasonable or
uncompelling to another.
Practically speaking, two factors appear to dominate the analysis:
human conditions take priority over natural properties, and past and
present uses take priority over potential equitable utilization. 119 However, each state may value different factors more or less than another
114 U.N. SECRETARIAT, Department of Technical Cooperation for Development, Legal and
Institutional Aspects of River Basin Development, in Natural Resources Water Series No. 20:
River and Lake Basin Development at 138, U.N. Doc. St/TCD/13, U.N. Sales No. E.90.II.A.10
(1988).
115 Helsinki Rules, supra note 107, at art. V.
Article V.
(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article IV is to be
determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in
the territory of each basin state;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each
basin state;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin state;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin state;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social
needs of each basin state;
(h) the availability of other sources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters in the basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin states as a means
of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin state.
Id.
116 Id. at art. V(2).
117 See id. at art. V.
118 Helsinki Rules, supra note 107, at art. V; Niva Telerant, Riparian Rights Under International Law: A Study of the Israeli-JordanianPeace Treaty, 18 LoY. L.A. IN'L & COMp. L.J. 175,
186 (1995).
119 Telerant, supra note 118.
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state. The Helsinki Rules do not dictate the priority of one factor.
Accordingly, all the factors are c6nsidered together and a conclusion
is reached on the basis of all the factors.
However, these rules are limited in application because they do
not constitute a treaty, 120 approved and signed by any particular countries; nor are they an international convention. The Rules do not bind
a state unless it has adopted them, and river basin states are not required to do so. 2 ' In practice, the Nile basin states appear to adhere
to principles and create treaties that are in conflict with many of the
Helsinki principles. 22
2. Current Doctrine: Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses
Prior to the 1970s, international water law was developed by the
ILA. However, in the 1970's the International Law Commission
(ILC) entered the field, by placing on its Agenda the law on "NonNavigational Uses of International Water Courses."' 123 From then on,
the ILC became involved in developing international water law.
The Commission examined existing sources of watercourse
law, 24 and concluded that significant support existed for the principle
of equitable utilization, and that it had in fact been the governing rule
of law for dealings concerning international watercourses. 25 The
Commission considered two schools of thought concerning the role of
equitable utilization in water law. The first suggested that equitable
utilization should be expanded by adopting a "no appreciable pollution harm" rule that was not qualified by the principle of equitable
and reasonable use. 12 6 The second opposed the idea that water uses
that caused appreciable pollution harm to other watercourse states
120 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 101. A treaty is "an international agreement concluded between
states in written form and governed by international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treatises, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
121 See Jacobs, supra note 24, at 100-01.
122 Id at 101. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, supranote 28, provides for full utilization of
the Nile waters, allocates 55.5 BCM of water to Egypt and 18.5 BCM to Sudan, and does not
reserve any share for the upstream riparians. Caponera, supra note 18, at 659.
123 Jacobs, supra note 24, at 103. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work
of Its Thirty-Ninth Session: The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water
Courses, U.N. Doe. A/42/10 (1987) [hereinafter UN ILC Thirty-Ninth Session].
124 Robert Rosenstock, First Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/Cn.4/451 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Report]. The Commission
examined a range of sources from customary law to state practice and restatements of law. Id.
125 UN ILC Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 123 at 73-74.
126 C. Stephen McCaffrey, Fourth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses at 14, UN Doe. AICN.4/412IAdd.2 (1988); see also C. Stephen McCaffrey,
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were per se inequitable and unreasonable. 12 7 During the 1993 ILC
session, a third school of thought arose that reflected a middle course.
This school suggested that equitable and reasonable use should be
subordinated when harm is detected, unless a clear showing of extraordinary circumstances was made to prevent appreciable pollution
1
harm. 2
Finally, after two decades of work on this topic and various
drafts, the ILC adopted a final draft in 1994 relating to the law governing non-navigational uses of international watercourses (Draft Articles).' 2 9 For the most part, the Draft Articles do not stray from the
original principles it set forth in previous drafts. 30 The ILC's Draft
Articles comprise thirty-three articles, supplemented by a resolution
on transboundary ground water. 131 Part II of the Draft Articles encompasses the general principles of watercourse law, including 'that of
equitable utilization, presented in the Helsinki Rules. 132
However, the Commission's work is not a complete adoption of
the Helsinki Rules' principles. Specifically, the Draft Articles differ
The Law of InternationalWatercourses:Some Recent Developments and Unanswered Questions,
17 DENv. J. INr'L L. PoL'Y 505, 510 (1989).

127 Bourne, supra note 90.
128 Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session: The
Law of the Non-NavigationalUses of InternationalWater Courses, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Articles], articulated a
middle course as follows:
Watercourse states shall exercise due diligence to utilize and international watercourse in
such a way as not to cause significant harm to the other watercourse states, absent their
agreement, except as may be allowable under an equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse. A use which causes significant harm in the form of pollution shall be presumed to
be an inequitable and unreasonable use unless there is: (a) a clear showing of special circumstances indicating a compelling need for an ad hoc adjustment; and (b) the absence of
any imminent threat to human health and safety.
129 Draft Articles, supra note 128. The Draft Articles are being considered by the United
Nations General Assembly.
130 Id.

131 Id. Wouters, supra note 100, at 421.
132 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 5-10; Articles 6 and 7 of the Draft Articles demonstrate the influence of the Helsinki Rules on the international watercourse principles found in
the Draft Articles. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 107, at arts. VI, VII.
Article 6. Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation
1. Watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse system in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse system shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining
optimum utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of
the international watercourse system.
2. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse system in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation
includes both the right to utilize the international watercourse system as provided in paragraph 1 of this article and the duty to co-operate in the protection and development
thereof...

Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 6-7.
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from their ILA counterpart in three respects. 3 First, the ILA analyzes past and present uses, while the Draft Articles consider present
and future uses.'3 Second, the ILA's Helsinki Rules function solely
on the principle of equitable utilization, whereas the Draft Articles
encompass the principle of equitable utilization, as well as the concept
of no harm. 3 5 Third, the Draft Articles preference certain factors 136
in
equally.
factors
all
treat
Rules
Helsinki
the
where
harm,
evaluating
The ILC intended the Draft Articles to supply states with a general framework, within which they would provide the specifics
through negotiations.137 To serve as a framework, the Draft Articles
articulated states' general duties and obligations. This general framework was also intended to ensure global approval of the Draft Articles
by the various states.138 Specifically, the Draft Articles' adoption of
the equitable utilization principle will garner additional global support
because many experts consider equitable utilization to be sufficiently
1 39
flexible to accommodate the unique aspects of a watercourse.
3.
a.

Text of the Draft Articles

Equitable Utilization and Harm

Article 5 of the Draft Articles requires that a state utilize a watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. 14 0 "By balancing the
133 Telerant, supra note 118, at 188.
134 See Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 6(d); see Helsinki Rules, supranote 107, at art.
V(d).

135 Helsinki Rules, supra note 107, at art. IV, Draft Articles, supra note 128 , at arts. 5; 7.
136 Helsinki Rules, supra note 107, at art. V; Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 6.
137 1993 Report, supra note 124. Special Rapporteur Robert Rosenstock argued that the concept of a framework agreement will best solve the problems surrounding the uses of international watercourses by providing:.
[F]or the States parties the general principles and rules governing the non-navigational uses
of international watercourses, in the absence of specific agreement among the states concerned, and provide guidelines for the negotiations of future agreements. This approach
recognizes that the optimal utilization, protection and development of a specific international watercourse is best achieved through an agreement tailored to the characteristics of
that watercourse and to the needs of the States concerned.
138 Scanlan, supra note 84, at 2180, 2211.
139 Id. at 2224.

140 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 5. Article 5 states:
1. Watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse
shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes
the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to co-operate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present articles.
Id.
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benefits enjoyed and the harms incurred by [the other states], [equitable utilization] does not automatically prohibit a specific use of an international river simply because it causes some harm to another
state." 14 1 If the Draft Articles did not incorporate the equitable utilization principle, one state could unilaterally "prohibit development on
a watercourse by other watercourse states."' 4 2 The Draft Articles also
provide guidance on what constitutes equitable utilization of the watercourse. Specifically, Article 6 enumerates a shorter list of factors
than those listed in the Helsinki Rules for determining what reasonable use means.' 4 3 Notably, while the Helsinki Rules include substaninclude "harm or
tial injury'" as a factor, this provision does not
1 45
"injury" as factors to assess equitable utilization.
However, Article 7 sets forth the principle of no harm, replacing
the former "no appreciable harm provision" of the 1991 draft.' 46 According to Article 7, a use that has been found to be both equitable
and reasonable under the factors set forth in Article 6 may be pre141

Scanlan, supra note 84, at 2224.

142 Id.

143 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 6. Article 6 states:
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner
within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:
(a) geographical, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a
natural character,
(b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) the population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
(d) the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other
watercourse States;
(e) existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of
the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
(g) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or
existing use.
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultation in a spirit of cooperation.
Id.
144 Helsinki Rules, supra note 107, at art. V; Wouters, supra note 100, at 439, n.27.
145 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 6.
146 Wouters, supranote 100, at 422. Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 7. Article 7 states:
1. Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international watercourse in
such a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States.
2. Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm is caused to another watercourse State, the State, whose uses causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to
such use, consult with the state suffering harm over.
(a) the extent to which the use has proved equitable and reasonable, taking into account the factors listed in Article 6;
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization, designed to eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused, and where appropriate, the question of compensation.
Id.
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cluded if it causes significant harm to another watercourse state. 14 7
Article 7 requires that a watercourse state exercise "due diligence" to
use a watercourse in a manner which does not cause "significant
harm.' 148 The Commentary to Article 7 sets forth a standard for evaluating whether a state has violated its due diligence responsibility
stating,
A watercourse State can be deemed to have violated its due diligence
obligation only if it knew or ought to have known that the particular use
of an international 149
watercourse would cause significant harm to other
watercourse States.
At first glance the due diligence standard of Article 7 is difficult
to reconcile with the equitable utilization standard set forth in Article
5. The Commentary of Article 7 attempts to clarify that Article 7 "is
setting forth a process aimed at avoiding significant harm as far as
possible while reaching an equitable result in concrete cases."' 15 0 Thus
in certain cases, the "equitable and reasonable utilization" of an international watercourse may still involve significant harm to another watercourse State" and "the principle of equitable utilization remains the
guiding criterion in balancing the interests at stake."'' However, paradoxically, the Commentary asserts that the obligation set forth in Article 7 "sets the threshold for lawful States activity."' 15 2 Therefore, it is
clear that the threshold determination is significant harm, and a use
found to be equitable and reasonable alone will not suffice. This position is supported by the text of Article 7, as well, which reduces the
principle of equitable utilization to a mere factor to be considered in
analysis where significant harm has occurred. 53 Under the Draft Articles a State may develop an equitable and reasonable use only where
it knows or ought to know that it would not cause significant harm to
other states. 154 However, despite the due dilligence standard, a state
has little concrete obligation upon a finding that significant harm occurs. States are required only to consult over whether the use is equitable and if the harm can be mitigated or compensated. 55
The prevalence of the significant harm threshold can also be seen
in Articles 10 and 21. Article 10 gives special weight to existing uses
147 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 7.
148 Id.

149
150
151
152
153

d. at commentary to art. 7; Wouters, supra note 100, at 422.
Draft Articles, supra note 128, at commentary to art. 7.
Id.; Wouters, supra note 100, at 423.
Draft Articles, supra note 128, at commentary to art. 7; Wouters, supra note 100, at 423.
Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 7(2).

154 Id. at commentary to art. 5; Wouters, supra note 100, at 423.
155 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 7.
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where "vital human needs" are involved. 156 "The prescribed preferential treatment of any particular factor precludes a true application
of the principle of equitable utilization and imposes a no harm ap-

proach aimed at protecting prior uses.' 57 Likewise Article 21 contains a'much more stringent prohibition against any pollution whether
or not it causes significant harm within the meaning of Article 7.158

b. Cooperation
The Commission also considered whether international water law
should impose a duty of international cooperation. 5 9 Commission
members determined that it was "unrealistic to attempt to impose a
mandatory obligation on States to cooperate even though there might
exist a need."' 60 However, the Draft Articles do in fact set forth several obligations of cooperation between the watercourse states. Article 5 also sets forth the principle of equitable participation. 161 First,
watercourse states have an obligation to put forth joint efforts in the
protection and development of a watercourse. 162 Second, states have
the right to expect the cooperation of other states in matters concerning the watercourse. 6 3
Article 9 sets forth a duty on behalf of the states to exchange data
and information to guarantee equitable utilization of the watercourse."6 However, the Draft Articles require the exchange of data
156 Id. at 424; Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 10(2), states:
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors as set forth in articles 5 to 7, with special
regard given to the requirements of vital human needs.
The Commentary to Article 10 described this consideration as "an accentuated form" of the
factor (1)(b) of Article 6. Draft Articles, supra note 128, at commentary to art. 10.
157 Wouters, supra note 100, at 424.
158 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 21.
159 UN ILC Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 123, at 41-45.
160 Id.at 41.
161 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 5.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at art. 9. Article 9 states:
1. Pursuant to article B, watercourse states shall on a regular basis exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological nature, as well as related forecasts.
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to provide data or
information that is not readily available, it shall employ its best efforts to comply with the
request but may condition its compliance upon payment by the requesting State of the reasonable costs of collecting and, where appropriate, processing such data or information.
3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect, and where appropriate, to
process data and information in a manner which facilitates its utilization by the watercourse
States to which it is communicated.
Id.
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only if readily available, and where it is not available a state need only
use "best efforts. ' 165 Thus the Draft Articles intentionally avoid lan166
guage that places a heavy and costly burden on states to comply.
c. Priority of Uses
The Draft Articles vary from the Helsinki Rules with respect to
how each prioritizes uses of the watercourse. The Helsinki Rules analyze past and present uses, while the Draft Articles consider present
and future uses. The varying priority treatment of uses can prove to
be a point of significant tension with regard to the Nile basin states.
Upper riparian states such as Ethiopia will likely favor a priority of
future uses. Countries, such as Egypt and Sudan, who have been enjoying unfettered use of the Nile for the better part of the last century
are more likely to favor a priority of past or present uses.
The Draft Articles also provide a default rule. Article 10 sets
forth the principle that one use of an international watercourse may
enjoy inherent priority over another use.' 67 Under Article 10, the
states are given the ability to place a specific value upon each use so
long as such value is based on either agreement or custom.' 68 If a use
is determined not to have been established either by custom or agreement, then the conflict is resolved by the factors set forth in Articles 5
to 7.169

4. Restatement Principles

Though principles embodied in the Restatement have not had the
170
same influential value as those articulated by the ILC or the ILA,
they reflect many of the same principles, and expand on some. Specifically, "environmental harm" is not limited to pollution. 171 However,
165 Iad

166 Id.

167 Id. at art. 10. Article 10 states:
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors as set forth in articles 5 to 7, with special
regard given to the requirements of vital human needs.
Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.

170 RESTATEMENT (THRD)OF FORIGrN RELATIONS § 601 (1992) [hereinafter REs(3RD)].

171 Id. at section 601. The introductory note to section 601 states:
Environmental harm may be caused by activities other than pollution; a dam may cause
erosion, or irrigation may increase the salinity of a fiver. Other environmental problems of
international concern include the need to improve habitat and human settlements; to protect archeological treasures, cultural monuments, nature sanctuaries, endangered fauna and
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like the Helsinki rules and the Draft Articles, jhe Restatement does
not provide an operational definition for pollution, but rather, speaks
in terms of "significant injury."' 72 Significant injury is not defined, but
international law makes reference to "significant" impact. 173 The Restatement, however, recognizes that significant injury may be qualified
if it is balanced by the benefits or importance of the activity of the
offending state.174 Again, this balancing will take into account various
subjective factors and judgments. 75 A country may desire to assume
a risk, believing that the potential benefits will far exceed any harm.
However, in the eyes of another country that will reap no benefits, the
risk may be significant. The Restatement mentions this idea of "significant risk" and obligates the state to take preventative measures. 76
Again it leaves the determination of "significant risk" to the various
states.
III.

CLARIFYING MODERN Docrnmns AND FORMING

A

SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AGREEMENT

The current doctrines governing international watercourses provide only a starting point for any negotiation or international agreement. Specifically, any international water agreement must include:
commitments by all the basin states to share the watercourse, an acceptance of the principle of equitable utilization qualified by a threshflora, and migratory birds; to lessen the consequences of deforestation, overfishing, and
weather modification.
Id.
172 Id. State Obligations with Respect to Environment of Other States and Common
Environment
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable
under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the prevention,
reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction; and
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another
state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(2) A state is responsible to all other states
(a) for any violation of its obligations under Subsection (1)(a), and
(b) for any significant injury, resulting from such violation, to the environment of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction...
Id.
173 Id. at comment c. The word 'significant' excludes minor incidents causing minimal damage. Id..
174

1d

175 For a discussion on the different prevailing opinions among water law experts as to the
supremacy of certain uses of an international river, see B.R. CHAUHAN, Sn-rL MENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW Dxsptrus IN INTERNATIONA DRAiNAGrE BASINs 206 (1981).
176 REs(3RD), supra note 170.
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old no harm rule, mechanisms for pollution regulation and control,
and sanctions against polluters.
A. An International Watercourse Agreement Must Include All the
Basin States and the Principle of "Equitable Utilization"
as well as "No Harm"
Any successful international watercourse agreement must include
the participation of all the basin states. The treaties will have little
useful function if they do not include all the basin states. The Draft
Articles recognize the need for cooperation.177 The Commission requires that watercourse states "shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to
obtain optimum utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.' 17 International watercourse principles also require that watercourse, states negotiate to establish standards,
regulations and definitions that will ultimately govern. 179 However,
they are not mandatory, and cannot bind any basin state without its
permission.' 80 Nor are they universally accepted over traditional or
customary law.18 ' In addition, the Draft Articles have assumed participation by all the states of the watercourse. 8 However, participation
has been one of the major obstacles, and it is doubtful whether an
agreement that does not include all the basin states as parties is
effective.
In order for these principles to be adopted, watercourse states
must want to adopt them.'8 3 As a first step, the Nile river basin states
must recognize their mutual dependence on the Nile and the need to
control those polluting the Nile more aggressively. 84 Because
problems along the Nile affect other states as well, the traditional concept of absolute territorial sovereignty cannot prevail. In fact, any
legal obligation or duty that international "law imposes on states to
refrain from polluting activities, or to prevent others from polluting,
necessarily involves a diminution or relinquishment of territorial state
177 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 8.
178 It.

179 See Developments in the Law, supra note 92, at 1552-54.
180 Id.
181 Id.

182 Draft Articles, supranote 128, at art. 4. "Every watercourse state is entitled to participate
in the negotiation.

.

." Id.

183 Id.

184 James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the PrecautionaryPrinciplein International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVr'L L.J. 423 n.3, 430-31 (1995).
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pollution
sovereignty because states no longer are free to deal with
18 5
originating inside their territory in any way they choose.'
Furthermore, an agreement must adopt the principles of equitable utilization and no significant harm. Thus, the needs of each state
are to be considered on an equal basis with the needs of the other
states sharing the basin water. If the basin states accept this rule, then
they are acknowledging the legitimate rights of all the basin states,
which is a step away from the positions that they have taken for the
better part of the century. In addition, any agreement must also include the principle of no significant harm as set forth in the Draft
Articles. 8 6 Accordingly, a use that has been deemed to be both equitable and reasonable may and should still be prohibited if it causes
significant harm to another watercourse state. 87 Preventative measures may be one aspect of mitigating harm to another state. However,
such measures alone should not be the sole justification for proceeding with an activity if the harm remaining is still significant.
Thus, the countries must, together and acknowledging the rights
of each, adopt the principle of co-operation. 88 This must include the
abandonment of any "historical" claims or assertions of precedence,
as has been typical in that region. While Egypt will undoubtedly not
relinquish its claim to a "historical" right to the Nile completely, in the
face of imminent disastei of dwindling water reserves and upstream
pollution sources, it has more to gain than any of the other co-riparians from increased cooperation. 89 It is important that Egypt continue negotiations without placing preconditions like those in the 1959
treaty.
B. A Successful Agreement Must Include Pollution Management
and Prevention, Not Just Water Allocation
Treaties will have little success if they do not include all the basin
states. Nor will they have any use if they solely refer to water rights
and water allocation. Rather, they must take into account pollution
and its effect on water allocation. 9 The mutual goal allocating water
185 Id.
186 Draft Articles, supra note 128, at art. 7.
187 Id.

188 Hickey & Walker, supranote 184, at 440. Co-operation means in particular to study, with
aims to find a solution, those environmental problems that arise and escape the boundaries of
the individual states, and to adapt the mutual aim of preventing and controlling transboundary
water pollution, for the improvement of the quality of the water source. Id.
189 See Egypt New Nile Water Strategy Needed, Am. ECON. DIG. 11 (1995).
190 See Ogolla, supra note 35.
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between these basin states today must include the management of pollution along the international watercourse. 191
1.

Defining Pollution

The definition of pollution is often provided in broad terms that
need to be supplemented. One definition provides that "pollution is
the qualitative alteration of any medium for the worse so that long
established equilibria between life systems which the medium sustains
are either adversely affected or even irreparably damaged."' 19 According to the ILA, pollution means "any introduction by man, directly or indirecly, of substance or energy into the environment
resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human
health, harm living resources, ecosystems and material property and
impair amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the environment."'1 93 The Draft Articles define pollution as "any detrimental
alteration in the composition or the quality of the watercourse which
results directly or indirectly from human conduct."'1 94 Each of these
definitions of pollution can only function when adopted alongside a
framework for determining what constitutes a '"qualitative alteration,"
"deleterious effect," or "detrimental alteration."
Furthermore, a number of different processes can alter or affect
the quality of water. These various polluting activities also need to be
characterized. For instance, biological pollution stems from the discharge of sewage and other biological wastes. 95 Industrial pollution
stems from complex chemical wastes that are dumped into a body of
water causing a deterioration of water quality. 196 Such chemical
wastes include residue carried by run-off into the water supply from
the predominantly agricultural economies of Africa. 197 However, the

most predominant pollutant waste from agricultural activities is the
sediments load from croplands, overgrazed pastures, and unprotected
forest soils. 198 Thus, because pollutants come from a variety of diverse sources, it is important to identify and regulate each separately.
The Draft Articles do not indicate what should be considered a pollu191 See id.

192 Ogolla, supra note 35, at 151.
193 ILA Rules on InternationalLaw Applicable to TransfrontierPollution. Concluded at Mon-

treal, 4 September 1982. 60 I.L.A. 158 (1983).
194 Draft Articles, supra note 128.
195 Ogolla, supra note 35, at 151.
196 Id.
197 Id.

198 Id
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tant, but rather, leave it up to the conglomeration of states.'9 The
states should attempt to identify the various polluting processes within
their boundaries. It is only then that they can and should establish a
list of substances that may be considered pollutants when introduced
into the watercourse and that may ultimately result in a harm to the
watercourse. 0 °
2. Determining Existing Harm and Injury
Moreover, the Agreement should include a manner for determining whether a harm or injury has occurred. In Egypt, most of the industrial projects were not designed with the pollution problem in
mind.2 0 Therefore, their design does not include pollution control
equipment.20 2 It is estimated that Egypt alone needs two billion
Egyptian pounds to provide its industrial projects with the necessary
equipment. 3 Any agreement must address the current instances of
harm and pollution. Furthermore, any agreement must include means
of addressing these practices. An effective licensing system can be a
means of monitoring and controlling existing polluting practices. The
licensing process would enable the governments to regulate and control the exploitation of their water resources.20 4 The licensing authority would have the power to impose conditions that address specific
pollution concerns. The licensing agency would regulate any industry
who seeks to abstract, divert, impound or discharge into the water
source. 20 5 For instance, such a system would require a license to discharge effluents by any factory or industry. However, today, most of
the African countries under pollution control legislation do not require a licence for the discharge of effluents.2 6 Furthermore, requiring licenses to be renewed yearly will aid in updating and monitoring
current levels of pollutants.
Any international agreement must include a provision requiring
the sharing of information and data. As a starting point, this informa199 Draft Articles, supra note 128. The Draft Articles state that "Watercourse States shall, at
the request of any of them, consult with a view to establishing lists of substances, the introduction of which into the waters of an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored."
200 1&
201 Shawky, supra note 74, at 142.
202 Id.

203 Id.

204 Ogolla, supra note 35, at 151.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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tion is useful in monitoring pollution and evaluating if harm has
occurred.
However, where the basin states are developing countries, industrial development often takes precedence over long-term environmental concerns. °7 Thus, it may be difficult for states to admit that their
current actions are "harming" the water source. This further complicates the efforts made in drawing the line between one state's definition of "harm" or "injury" and another's definition of "use" and
"benefit." "Harm" in the Helsinki Rules was "substantial injury," in
the Draft Articles, was defined as "significant harm," and in the Restatement, harm was "significant injury." All require further analysis
and definition by the states to be operable.
3. PredictingHarm
Finally, the agreement must provide a method for assessing future harm and thus preventing pollution and injury. Pollution, protection and the preservation of the environment are made reference to in
the Draft Articles, holding that the "states shall, individually or
jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of the international watercourses. ' 20 The present doctrines require watercourse states to,
either individually or together, prevent, reduce, and control pollution
that may harm human life and safety, damage the watercourse, or
cause significant harm to the other watercourse states.02 9 Again the
terms "significant harm" and "beneficial purpose" are used without
further clarification. Thus, it may be difficult to determine these factors, even though the watercourse states are expected to harmonize
their policies.210 In order to prevent pollution and preserve the
ecosystem of the international watercourses, there must be a method
by which states predict potential harm, analyze risk, and thus prevent
it.
207 Shawky, supra note 74, at 142.
208 Draft Articles, supranote 128, at art. 20. "Article 20. Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems: Watercourse States shall, individually or jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of
international watercourses." Id.
209 Id. at art 21(2).
Article 21. Prevention, reduction and control of pollution
2. Watercourse states shall, individually or jointly, prevent, reduce and control pollution of
an international watercourse that may cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States
or to their environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters
for any beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse. Watercourse States
shall take steps to harmonize their policies in this connection.
Id.
210 Id.
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Current international water law is cast in terms of harm that has
already occurred, rather than evaluations of future harm that may occur. 211 By being unable to provide concrete standards or definitions
for what constitutes harm or injury, it is difficult to develop operational indicators of future harm. As a result, phrases such as "acceptable injury' ' 2 11 and "significant risk ' 2 13 have emerged. By utilizing this
standard of "acceptable" or "significant," states may take into account
and accept some risk of pollution harm in exchange for other benefits,
such as resource development or industrial growth. Again, this "acceptable risk" or "significant injury" of pollution harm brings into
play many factors.2 14 One state may consider the pollution risk acceptable, while another may find the risk of harm unacceptable and
significant.2 15
C. A Successful Agreement Must Include Provisions of Private
Accountability
1.

Filling the Gaps of Civil Sanctions

Any agreement between basin states must include provisions providing for and enforcing civil sanctions. In general, civil sanctions currently fall short for two reasons. First, the existence of civil sanctions
is small and lack clarity.216 This results, first, from a lack of uniformly
set quality and pollution standards, either within one country or
among the whole states along the Nile basin. 17 States need to adapt
international water law principles and determine a workable definition of either water quality standards or effluent discharge standards.2 18 Upon establishing such standards, States must design a
licensing system requiring polluting entities to obtain such permits and
to continually renew such permits. This allows States to monitor con211 Helsinki Rules, supra note 107. The Helsinki Rules suggest a reasonableness determination. However, it is difficult to evaluate a reasonable use if there is no mechanism for determining what damage may result from that use. Id

212 See Paisley & McDaniels, supra note 99.
213 Rns(3RD), supra note 170.
214 There are many standards involved in assessing acceptable risk. Some factors include the
costs and benefits of alternatives. Stephen L. Derby & Ralph L. Keeney, Risk Analysis: Understanding How Safe is Safe Enough?, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 217 n.3 (1981). Other assessments con-

sider people's confidence in new technology and the degree to which risks are known to science.
P. Slovic, Perceptionof Risk, 236 ScIENca 280 (1987).

215 Paisley & McDaniels, supra note 99.
216 Ogolla, supra note 35, at 153-55.
217 Id. "[T]here is no definition of either water quality criteria or effluent discharge stan-

dards." Id at 153.
218 Id
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formance with established standards. It also provides a manner for
states to communicate standards to industries and to require compliance. These standards need to include regulations for corporate industries, state industries, as well as non-industrial activities on the

land that adversely effect the Nile water.2 19 Without such a guideline
for determining the existence of pollution and compliance with standards, enforcement agencies, if there are any, cannot determine if
sanctions are required.2 0 Second, even countries with elaborate regulatory schemes need agencies with both monitoring and enforcement
agencies. 221 There are very few agencies within the Nile basin states'
national governments that assess current and potential pollution and
determine any violations.22 2 As a result, corporations have gone virtually unchecked. 22 Any agreement must establish an obligation on
states to monitor and enforce any promulgated standards. Thus,
states must establish agencies to monitor and enforce compliance. As
a result, civil sanctions fail to have any deterrent impact on the polluting corporations and have not been an effective method for pollution
control.
2. EstablishingCriminal Sanctions
Currently one of the primary tools of compliance has been the
recent trend towards criminal sanctions. The debate over criminal
sanctioning of corporate misconduct has attracted serious study by
Id. Very few countries take into account and regulate non-industrial activities. Id.
220 Id.. The World Health Organization pointed out in 1973 that most of the pollution
problems in Kenya were a result of a lack of enforcement of existing law. In addition, within
developing countries, it found that environmental management and activism were constrained
by development discretionary powers vested in the enforcement agencies in the countries surveyed. Id.
221 See Unified Environmental Law, 17 MDDLE EAsT EXECUTIVE REPORTS 10 (1994) [hereinafter Unified Environmental Law]. The EEAA's functions are summarized:
- formulate policy, prepare plans for coastal protection, hazardous waste, air pollution,
land and water pollution and pollution prevention, and implement pilot projects.
- set the environmental norms and conditions to be followed during the construction of
any project and the necessary norms and standards to assure compliance with permissible limits of pollutants.
establish mechanisms for conducting environmental impact assessments, which are required for all development projects to insure compliance with environmental regulations
and standards.
- establish and supervise an environmental monitoring network.
- prepare plans for environmental training, education, and public awareness.
- collect and publish environmental information and prepare an annual report of the state
of the environment.
222 The Department of Irrigation in Egypt has been assigned the task of regulating pollutants
dumped into the Nile as a result of irrigation. It has been criticized on numerous occasions for
failing to perform its duty.
223 See generally Ogolla, supra note 35.
219

1121

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

17:1091 (1996-97)

many countries around the world, especially in the area of environmental pollution. Specifically, corporate misconduct has become a
matter of increasing importance. 24 However, the Nile basin states

must adopt the implementation of criminal sanctions against those
who pollute if any efforts to control pollution are to be successful.
Criminalizing the conduct of corporations and its corporate officers for violating environmental pollution standards is an effective
alternative to civil sanctions that continually fall short of their set
goals.2 2 5 Civil sanctions touch the corporation and its pockets; however, they do not reach to the corporate officer or manager who is
responsible for running the corporation.22 6 Because civil sanctions do
not touch the corporate officer or manager, civil sanctions are often

regarded as a cost of doing business, not as a threat for compliance.22 7
Often the penalties are less expensive than corporate compliance with
the law.228 While criminal prosecution will not always be an appropriate response, 229 it may be appropriate when the offender intentionally
violates standards and has failed to respond to administrative
sanctions.2 3 o

Moreover, the fear of criminal prosecution will give rise to a
more rigid balancing equation. Corporate officers and managers will
no longer have an ambivalent view of environmental compliance and
will not consider violations of environmental standards a cost of doing
business. 3 Instead, by establishing corporate sanctions, they will
view noncompliance as a crime for which they personally are held liable rather than a corporate calculation.232
224 See Roman Tomasic, Sanctioning Corporate Crime and Misconduct: Beyond Draconian
J. Cosa. L. 82 n.2 (1992).
and Decriminalizing Solutions, 2 AusTAL
225 See Wolf, infra note 227.
226 Id. at 1. (Civil sanctions do not strike at "the corporate officer or manager whose policies
and decisions guide or influence corporate environmental compliance"). Id.
227 Sidney M. Wolf, Findingan EnvironmentalFelon Under the CorporateVeil- The Responsible CorporateOfficer Doctrine and RCRA, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTr.. L. 1, n.1 (1993). Moreover,
because they are aimed at the entity, they may eventually harm interests held by shareholders
and consumers. Id.
228 Id. at 2.
229 See Eliane L. Hughes, Sentencing Environmental Offenders: Objectives and Principles,4 J.
ENvTL. L. PRpc. 185 (1994).

230 Id. at 186. Prosecution may be the appropriate response if the offender is "negligent; violates standards deliberately; ignores repeated warnings or requests by authorities, knows of
problems but chooses to devote its resources elsewhere; violates permit terms that it originally
negotiated for itself;, has a previous record; has failed to respond to administrative sanctions; is
deceptive, flagrant or cavalier in its attitude, or has engaged in particularly damaging misconduct." ld.
231 Wolf, supra note 227, at 2.
232 Id.
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a.

Egypt's Adoption of Criminal Sanctions

As a result of the rising threat to Egypt's population and national
security, Egypt has implemented an aggressive anti-pollution program
that will be administered by the Egyptian Environmental Affairs
Agency (EEAA), by which corporate polluters will be held liable
under criminal rather than administrative law.23 3 Egypt's environmental law is the first aggressive step the country has taken to combat
pollution in the region. 3 4 It is also the first time that Egypt has given
any government entity the power to ensure that environmental provisions are designed and implemented.23 5 Previously, the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), formed in 1982, had merely
served a coordinating and monitoring function.23 6 The new law gives
the EEAA enforcement and monitoring powers as well as its traditional coordinating powers. 23 7 Also, the new law is organized to address different types of pollution. 23 8
Penalties in the Egyptian law now include criminal sanctions. 23 9
This is the beginning for such legislation in Egypt, which has in the
past been, along with the other Nile basin states, more willing to overlook polluting activities in the name of development.
b.

Council of Europe's Trend Towards Criminal Sanctions

Egypt's law is in harmony with a trend in international water law
to criminalize offenses. On June 22, 1995, the 34 nation Council of
Europe presented a draft Convention "which would make breaches of
233 Unified EnvironmentalLaw, supranote 221. This current law repeals Egypt's environmental Law 72/1968, and confirms compliance requirements with provisions of Law 48/1982. Id.
234 Id.

235 Id.
236 Law Strengthens GovernmentAuthority to ProtectEnvironment, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY,
Feb. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, BNAIED File. [hereinafter EEAA BNA
Daily, Feb. 1994].
237 Unified Environmental Law, supra note 221.
238 Id.The main body of the law is organized into four sections concerning protection of land,
air and water, and penalties for violations. It gives the existing establishments a three-year grace

period to comply with the new law before risking penalties. The Cabinet can extend this for two
more years. Id.It provides that the EEAA will be run by a board of 20 members, some from the
public business sector, as well as government officials. The members include: "the minister concerned with environmental affairs (chairman), the executive chairman of the EEAA (vice-chairman); representatives from six ministries; two environmental experts chosen by the board
chairman; three representatives of nongovernmental organizations, three representatives from
the public business sector, wo representatives from universities and scientific research centers, a
high ranking official from the EEAA, and the head of the legal department in the State Council." Id. at 11-12.
239 Id
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environmental rules a matter of criminal law.""2 The Convention
,would require "the states to adopt such appropriate measures as may
be necessary to establish as criminal offenses under domestic law,
when committed intentionally:"
The discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of substances
or radiation into the air, the soil or water, which causes, or creates a
significant risk of death or serious injury to any person;
The unlawful discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of
substances or radiation into the air, the soil or water, which causes their
lasting deterioration or causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury
to any person or substantial damage to protected monuments, other protected objects, property, animals or plants.

National governments are now studying the draft Convention. 24 '
c. United Nations' Principles Governing Criminal Sanctions
During a United Nations Conference held in Egypt in 1995, a
consensus among the participating nations was formed during a twoday workshop.24 2 The conference focused on fighting and preventing
crime, including environmental crimes.2 4 3 The fundamental legal concept in civil law for many European and Latin American countries is
that companies be penalized under a regime of administrative law
rather than criminal law.24 4 This is consistent with the idea that guilt
is a human expression, not one that applies to corporations.24 5
240 Council of Europe Looks at Criminal Prosecutionfor Pollution,EUR. COMMUNrrY ENERGY MoNTHLY, July 14, 1995, at Energy [hereinafter COE]. Only the United Kingdom under
its common law system already holds corporate polluters criminally liable for damages and holds
owners or occupiers of contaminated land liable for environmental pollution, even if they were
not responsible for the contamination, and hold them criminally liable if they fail to comply after
being served with a remedial notice. In many European countries which use Roman law, only
individuals can be prosecuted for a criminal act.
This draft was a result of the Council of Europe's crime committee and has not to date been
approved by the Council as a whole. It follows an earlier Council of Europe Convention on civil
liability for environmental damage, which opened for signatures in June 1993. While the civil
liability draft dealt "with compensation for victims of environmental damage, the new draft
would make it possible for polluters to be prosecuted in criminal courts." COE, supra note 240.
241 Id.

242 Environmental Crime: Firms Should Be Held Accountable for Crimes Against Environment, UN Meeting Concludes, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, May 10, 1995 [hereinafter Environmental Crime, BNA DAiLY]
243 Id.

244 Id. (From an interview with Gunter Heine, an expert on environmental and penal law and
a researcher for the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law). Id.
245 Id.
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The workshop developed principles concerning the difficulty of
ascertaining liability of the responsible individuals. 246 The following

principles were developed for inclusion in any water agreement:247
" An employee is held liable if he or she violates company policy.
" It is unfair to hold an employee liable if the supervisor told him or her
to cause environmental harm.
" If a high ranking official is negligent, the corporation is liable.
* If the company's policy is negligent, the business can be held liable.
" Managers can be put in jail for a specific period of time for each employee that causes pollution.
" A company can evade liability if it reports an incident to the government within 24 hours.

In addition to assessing the need to modify countries' legal systems, the workshop discussed potential strategies to prevent environ-

mental crimes. The primary element of their strategies was
communication, not just between the participating states, but between
state governments and corporations. 2 48 This is an area which the Nile
basin states have found the most frustrating; agencies in the basin
states are not capable of taking on such a task.
Egypt's law establishes a wide array of fines and punishments, but
makes a distinction for intentional or egregious conduct.2 4 9 However,
consistent with the concern of the United Nations and Council of Europe, it may be difficult to determine which individual to hold liable,
especially where the corporation is large and many people are
involved.
Ultimately, the adoption of criminal sanctions by Egypt was necessary. Criminal sanctions are also necessary along the Nile basin
246 Id. Western Europe has tended to focus on the person in charge of particular functions in
polluting corporations. However, where there are different departments and many people that
play a role in the manufacturing process, it is difficult to ascertain individual liability. Id.
247 Id.

248 Id. At the end of the workshop, Herman Woltring, moderator for the workshop and director of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNCRI), outlined
several strategies that the countries could take, including estimated costs of the endeavors:
Involving high level government officials in regional conferences of about 20 countries to
form stronger corporate measures. Estimated cost of meeting and follow-up activities,
estimated cost: $90,000.
- Developing a manual to facilitate a country's compliance with environmental laws, prevent environmental crimes, and prosecute them. Estimated cost: $33,500.
- Producing a report from experts to examine national laws and how they could conform
to international conventions and be implemented. Estimated cost: $33,500.
- Improving the effectiveness of international conventions. Estimated cost: $100,000.
- Conducting research into the seriousness of environmental crimes in a country. Estimated cost: $14,500.
249 Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 9th. Sess., 18
INER 323, April 29-May 8, 1995, accepted Plen. 9th. Sess., U.N. Doc. D26 (1995).
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states. However, they should not be used arbitrarily or as a primary
sanction. They should only be used when the conduct involved is intentional or egregious,2 50 not when it is a result of recklessness or negligence, 251 unless there has been a history of such action.252
Criminal law on an international level has always raised many
concerns. 25 3 However, in order for it to be effective and fair, coordination of such sanctions should be at the international level. The law
should be drafted so that it applies to all the states involved in a like
and uniform manner. This, along with the management of pollution,
should be tasks given to an enforcement agency that represents all of
the states and their interests or to individual agencies within each
states' boundary.
IV.

ESTABLISHING A FORUM FOR ENFORCEMENT AND
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The Nile river basin states must establish an agency or set up a
cooperative committee to regulate and enforce an international watercourse agreement and provide a forum for dispute resolution. 25 4 The
United States has established joint commissions such as the International Boundary and Water Commission and the International Joint
Commission to resolve conflicts over water resources with its neighbors. 255 In order to establish a forum that is effective and operates on
legitimate authority, the individual states must assent to its authority
and the treaty that created it and to which it can now bind them.256
Because states are sovereign entities, they may be hesitant or unwilling to cede any authority by signing an international environmental agreement.257 It is crucial to the success of any international
agreement that there be a forum which can uphold the agreement,
provide incentives for compliance and resolve conflicts that may arise
between the participating states.25 Such a forum must' have binding
authority over the states. It must function in a legislative, executive,
as well as judicial role.
250 See COE, supra note 240.

251 See Hughes, supra note 229.
252 See Environmental Crime, BNA DAILY, supra note 242.

253 See Hughes, supra note 229. See also Wolf, supra note 224.
254 See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 92.
255 LeRoy, supra note 13, at 320.
256 Cf. Samaan, supra note 12, at 261-68.
257 Developments in the Law, supra note 92, ati1550.

258 See id. at 1552. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and international development
agencies can provide such a forum, as well as provide economic incentives to comply with the
agreement. Id.
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A.

Its Legislative Role

The forum's legislative role will be primarily to develop regulations and oversee surveys and studies conducted. After the initial survey to determine the composition of the current Nile water is
completed, the forum will be responsible for surveying such composition regularly, to determine any additional matter that may be present
and dangerous. Furthermore, it should adopt laws similar to Egypt's
environmental law, which requires existing factories to obtain permits.
These permits should detail exactly what the factories dump into the
Nile, the manner in which they dump it, and whether it is treated prior
to dumping. As discussed earlier, there are a number of processes
that alter or affect the quality of the water, such as the dumping of
biological, chemical, or agricultural waste. 59 The forum should bear
in mind the different methods of polluting and require licensing or
permiting for all matters. 260 Having this information on fie and constantly updating it will provide an effective monitoring mechanism for
determining the origin of large amounts of pollutants and
contaminants.
Furthermore, to be effective, the forum should create incentive
programs for the states.2 6 ' Such incentive programs may provide,
among other things, opportunities to purchase foreign debt in exchange for a state's promise to provide a more elaborate environmental protection within its boundaries, and can make their loan programs
contingent on the states' adoption of certain environmental criteria.2 62
Also, such a forum may enhance compliance by setting up a training
program for state officials and thereby encourage environmental
awareness at the national level. The most prominent example of incorporating economic incentives into international environmental
treaties and agreements is the Montreal Protocol, which utilizes a system of trade barriers and side payments as incentives to take part in
the treaty.263 Establishing an agreement that provides incentives to
join beyond that of mere pollution control may induce countries that
259 Ogolla, supra note 35, at 151.
260 Id.

261 See Developments in the Law, supranote 92, at 1552.
262 Samaan, supra note 12, at 272.
263 Id. The Montreal Protocol was drafted as a supplement to the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, and attempts to ensure enforcement of a treaty through an incentive program of trade barriers and side payments. Id. Countries not involved as a party to the
Protocol are disadvantaged by the trade barriers and do not have access to the environmental

technological advancements. Id.
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are reluctant to reconsider.2 64 Specifically, if trade arrangements are
designed so that states that are not a party would be at a disadvantage,
then the incentive to join is greater.265
Finally, the forum must aim at harmonizing the various environmental laws and regulations of the individual states. Since the Nile
runs through many boundaries, an array of environmental laws is useless and ineffective. This can be developed alongside the exchange of
scientific and technical information, and the participation in conferences and other forms of cooperation.266
B. Its Executive Role
While it will be the legislative function of the forum to develop
regulations and continuously monitor progress, it is its executive function that will make its plans a reality. Under its executive power, the
forum will set up the plans and determine funding for its projects.
Funding in the context of environmental pollution control along the
Nile will not be difficult. Countries and organizations around the
world have contributed money to the Nile basin states in hopes of
managing the Nile pollution crisis.
In order to assure success of its executive function, the forum
must be recognized by all the participating states and its authority
must be binding.2 67 This will require many forms of legal maneuvering. Each country should be represented on the forum. Members
should be given seats according to a number of factors such as the
needs of the country, the population taking into account forecasts, the
contribution of water to the Nile, potential other sources for water
such as groundwater and acquifers, as well as historic and traditional
uses. These factors are not meant to be exhaustive, but should be
determined in the original treaty or agreement and revised when necessary. Furthermore, there should be seats reserved for United Na264 Id

265 See Developments in the Law, supra note 92, at 1567.
266 Samaan, supra note 12, at 272. "Several concerns must be addressed in drafting new
international environmental law. First, revelations from the scientific community are continuously changing the scope of environmental concerns, making it more difficult to identify the
most pressing issues. Therefore, environmental lawmaking must be conducted amidst great uncertainty about the reality, cause and extent of the problem; second, because the nature of environmental problems, such as ozone depletion, require concerted action, it is necessary that at
least the major contributors to the problem, present and future, be parties to the regime; third,
because it is difficult to separate environmental problems from one another and from developmental concerns generallyenvironmental lawmaking runs the risk of either being unmanageable
or not system oriented." Id. at 272.
267 See Developments in the Law, supranote 92, at 1550-55
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tions Representatives and experts and scientists in the field of
pollution and the environment. These positions do not need to be
given voting power, but may only function in an advisory function.
However, it is crucial to provide legitimacy for mutual cooperation in
the eyes of the states.
Also, it will be in its executive role that this forum may negotiate
with outside sources such as the United States Agency for International Development, or the World Bank, concerning loans, grants,
technological, or scientific assistance.
C. Its Judicial Role
It is more appealing to take part in a treaty that includes explicit
provisions of duties and obligations. By providing such detail in the
original agreement, judicial interpretation will appear less arbitrary.
Currently, there is no adequate forum to resolve disputes and apply the principles of international water law. The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) can resolve international issues. However, it lacks the
expertise to sufficiently resolve environmental issues and to enforce
environmental commitments.268 Only states have standing before the
court, though agencies or other international forums may be the best
suited and most willing to bring suits. 2 6 9 Establishming an adjudicating body will provide three advantages. First, the forum will deal
solely with the Nile basin states; therefore it can gain the legitimacy
and authority needed. Secondly, it will develop expertise in the issues
of that region, and the international agreements that govern. Finally,
because it is local and the states are parties to the agreement, claims
can be brought with expediency and decisions rendered efficiently.
Again, this is functional only if the forum is recognized by the participating states and given binding authority among them.
D. Funding the Forum
Pollution along international watercourses has caught the eye of
many nations and agencies around the world. It has reached such
drastic levels that billions of dollars have been loaned270 or granted to
268 Id. at 1562.

269 See Statute of the ICJ, supranote 86, at art. 34. Therefore, NGOs and other agencies must
look to their respective states to bring the disputes to the ICJ. However, public international
agencies can submit information and argument to the Court at their own initiative. Id. art. 34(1).
270 See Bruce M. Rich, The MultilateralDevelopment Banks Environmental Policy and the
United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681, 685 (1985). Rich notes that in 1983, the banks [the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African
Development Bank] lent over 20 billion dollars to fund projects in developing countries. Id.

1129

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

17:1091 (1996-97)

many of the Nile countries to combat pollution.2 7 ' In addition, the
basin states have allocated large amounts of money to curtailing pollution.27 2 Money is plentiful; what is needed is the desire for controlling

pollution.
Over the past decades, development assistance agencies have become aware that the benefits of development have many environmental costs. The World Bank was a leader, in that it was the first
multilateral agency that calculated and took into account the environmental impact of its activities. 273 Multilateral development banks
have more influence in development and policies of developing countries than any other financial institutions.274
With many sources for loans and grants, the Nile basin states
need to efficiently allocate their moneys together rather than to combat pollution on their own. When dealing with an international watercourse, states upstream necessarily affect states downstream. Thus if
their pollution prevention and control mechanisms are harmonized, it
will provide a more efficient and reachable goal.
The role of the agency or forum would be to oversee the allocation of money by countries such as the United States and institutions
such as the World Bank to the Nile basin states, and to provide technical and economic monitoring and support.
271 See ME Exec Reps, Water Supply, supranote 3.
As of 1993, ongoing US AID projects included:
* USAID No. 263-0100 - Alexandria Wastewater Expansion (1977-1993), for the financing and construction of a sewage development program, $390 million.
" USAID No. 262-0127 and 161.03 - Provisional Cities Development, urban infrastructure, improve water and wastewater systems (1984-1994), $110 million.
" USAID No. 263-0173 - Cairo Sewage II, increasing capacity of treatment plants and
expanding sewage collection systems in Cairo (1984-1994), $816 million.
" USAID No. 263-0174 - Canal Cities Water and Wastewater 11 (1987-1997), $380 million,
improvement of water and wastewater services.
" USAID No. 263-0176 - Water and Wastewater Institutional Support (1985-1994), $15
million increasing capabilities to meet these needs.
" USAID No. 263-0812 - Local Development II, including water and wastewater services
(1985-1993), $481 million for improving basic water services to water and wastewater
services to low-income residents in rural and urban residents.
272 Id. Egypt has a five-year plan which allocates to water pollution treatment plants in Cairo,
Alexandria, and other locations, allocating $303 million in special allocations for its first two
years (1992 and 1993). Id.
273 See John W. Kindt, Providing for Environmental Safeguards in the Development Loans
Given by the World Bank Group to the Developing Countries, 5 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 540, 544
(1975).
274 Rich, supranote 270, at 685; stating that, in 1983, the banks lent over twenty billion dollars
to fund projects in developing countries, four times the amount that was committed by the largest bilateral development agency, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Id.
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CONCLUSION

International river basin water shortage and pollution is a modem day nightmare. Water levels are falling, droughts are persistent,
and whatever water is available is polluted and dangerous to drink.
The Nile basin states face all of these problems. The existence of current international treaties and agreements among a few of the Nile
basin states are ineffective. Without including all the Nile basin states,
and taking into consideration the pollution of the Nile and its effect on
the amount of usable water, the ultimate allodation of water prescribed in these water sharing agreements is not representative of
what the agreements originally intended. The Nile basin states are
ready to negotiate. They have all suffered from famine, poor water
quality, and a population explosion. With a legitimate fear of war
over water rights, these states are finally ready to recognize the rights
of other riparians.
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